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Technology acquisition from external sources has been identified as a critical competence for 
sustained success in innovation, and research has paid a good deal of attention to studying its 
advantages, drawbacks, determinants and outcomes. Traditionally, research has modeled the 
choice to acquire technology from outside a firm’s boundaries as the result of a trade-off 
between the benefits of external acquisition (e.g., higher return on investment, lower costs, 
increased flexibility, access to specialized skill sets and creativity) and its drawbacks (e.g., 
opening the market to new entrants, risk of imitation of core competencies and reduced value 
appropriability). Yet, this view does not capture the behavioral considerations that may 
potentially encourage or discourage managers from sourcing technology outside the firm’s 
boundaries. This behavioral aspect is especially important if one wants to understand the conduct 
in external technology acquisition of family firms, that are found to favor strategic actions that 
preserve the controlling families’ control and authority over business, even at the cost of giving 
up potential economic benefits. Thus, external technology acquisition is likely to be interpreted 
differently in family and non-family firms. Despite its importance, how the involvement of a 
controlling family affects decisions in technology and innovation management and, specifically, 
external technology acquisition, is an overlooked topic in extant research and requires further 
theoretical and empirical examination. This study attempts to fill these gaps by extending the 
tenets of the behavioral agency model and prior research pointing to particularistic decision 
making in family firms to uncover the behavioral drivers of external technology acquisition in 
family and non-family firms. 
Theory is developed that relates performance risk, family management and the contingent effect 
of the degree of technology protection on external technology acquisition, and the hypotheses are 
tested with longitudinal data on 1,540 private Spanish manufacturing firms. The analyses show 
that managers are more likely to acquire technology from external sources through R&D 
contracting when firm performance falls below managers’ aspirations. Family firms are generally 
more reluctant to acquire external technology, and the effect of negative aspiration performance 
gaps becomes less relevant as family management is higher, which is attributed to family 
managers’ attempts to avoid losing control over the trajectory that technology follows over time. 
However, family firms become more favorable to consider the adoption of an open approach to 
technology development when some protection mechanisms (specifically, the filing of patents on 
the firm proprietary technologies) increase the managers’ perceptions of control over the 
technology trajectory. 
As such, this study makes a contribution to the understanding of the behavioral factors driving 
external technology acquisition, and it offers important insights regarding technology strategy in 













Technology acquisition from external sources has been identified as a critical competence for 
sustained success in product and process innovation. As a result of the growth of technology 
complexity, the shortening of product life cycles and the escalation of technology development 
costs, firms have increasingly sourced technology from outside their boundaries in the attempt to 
reduce development time and costs, share risks and access expertise not available in house (e.g., 
Calantone and Stanko, 2007). Although external technology acquisition has been a critical 
component of firm’s technology strategy since the 1980s (Chatterji, 1996), the recent debate 
around open and collaborative innovation paradigms indicates that it still ranks very high on the 
agenda of R&D and product managers (Dahlander and Gann, 2010; Lichtenthaler, 2011).  
 
As a consequence of this growing practical interest towards external technology acquisition, 
innovation scholars have put considerable effort in studying its determinants and benefits (e.g., 
see Swan and Allred, 2003). However, the risks and drawbacks of external technology 
acquisition have received comparatively minor attention (Lichtenthaler, 2011), which leads some 
scholars to consider it as a controversial decision in technology strategy (Almirall and 
Casadesus-Masanell, 2010; Boudreau, 2010). Prior research has shown that the uncertainty, 
information asymmetries and agency relationships engendered by technology acquisition from 
external parties require appropriability regimes that allow the firms to capture the economic 
benefits of their innovation efforts (Pisano, 1990; West, 2003). Most recent research has 
emphasized that openness to external technology sources also raises concerns regarding the 
firms’ ability to control the development trajectories that technology follows over time (Almirall 
and Casadesus-Masanell, 2010; Zirpoli and Becker, 2011). Thus, sourcing external technology 
emerges as a decision that, on the one hand, allows to potentially improve innovation 
performance (yet at the expense of higher uncertainty regarding the distribution of potential 
results) and, on the other, leads managers to operate in domains where they have less control 
than they have within their organizations. However, there is a gap regarding how managers 
assess positive and negative factors in choosing whether to acquire external technology or not, in 
spite of raising calls for research on those internal processes, including behavioral aspects, that 
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may be relevant for understanding potential barriers to technology acquisition from external 
sources (Lichtenthaler, 2011). 
 
A behavioral perspective is particularly important when assessing the conduct in external 
technology acquisition of family firms, which are defined as those firms whose decision making 
is driven by the family vision for how the firm will benefit the family across generations (Chua, 
Chrisman, and Sharma, 1999). Indeed, the family is an additional group of stakeholders in 
organizations that has the power and authority to impose on the firm the pursuit of family goals 
in addition to its economic goals (Chrisman et al., 2012). These goals derive from the controlling 
families’ willingness to protect their accumulated endowment of socioemotional wealth, and are 
reported to entail different cognitive logics for decisions affecting risk and control (Gomez-Mejia 
et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia, Makri, and Larraza-Kintana, 2010). 
How the involvement of a controlling family affects decisions in technology and innovation 
management and, specifically, external technology acquisition, is an overlooked topic in extant 
research (Cassia, De Massis, and Pizzurno, 2012; De Massis, Frattini, and Lichtenthaler, 
forthcoming-a; De Massis et al., forthcoming-b). This gap needs to be filled first because family 
firms are very common in all world economies and provide a significant contribution to 
economic growth and employment (La Porta et al., 1999). Family firms are, e.g., reported to 
generate 64% of GDP and employ 62% of the total workforce in U.S. (Astrachan and Shanker, 
2003), suggesting that innovation issues in family firms are of great interest to policy in order to 
foster economic development. Second, the cumulating evidence that strategic decisions in family 
firms reflect a broader array of economic and non-economic considerations than in non-family 
firms (Chrisman and Patel, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007) suggests that family involvement 
may significantly affect the characteristics of the technological innovation process in family 
firms. Finally, external technology acquisition is likely to be especially useful for family firms to 
achieve success in product and process innovation. Studies applying the behavioral agency 
model showed that the goal of preserving socioemotional wealth for the family inevitably leads 
to the adoption of a more conservative attitude that entails aversion to risk, implying inferior and 
greatly volatile R&D investments to develop innovations (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Chen and 
Hsu, 2009; Chrisman and Patel, 2012). But family firms need technological know-how as well as 
non-family firms to provide new products to the marketplace, because profits and 
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competitiveness come as a by-product of these activities (Christensen et al., 2004). 
Complementing their internal knowledge base with externally sourced technology seems thus an 
excellent compromise to improve innovation ability for family firms that typically underplay 
internal R&D investments.  
 
This article attempts to fill these gaps by developing and testing behavioral agency hypotheses 
for external technology acquisition of family and non-family firms. The greater uncertainty due 
to the simultaneous presence of positive and negative effects, and the possibility for dissimilar 
managers’ cognitive frameworks to influence the decision to source technology from outside, 
make the behavioral agency model (BAM) an appropriate framework to understand the factors 
driving firms’ decision to acquire external technology. From the BAM perspective, the decision 
to undertake risky activities such as to initiate searches for alternative routines and opportunities 
or, as proposed in this article, to open the boundaries of technology search by acquiring external 
technology is more likely to occur when a firm is dissatisfied with the status quo, namely when 
its performance falls below the target or aspiration level (Bromiley, 1991; Wiseman and Gomez-
Mejia, 1998). However, the reference point varies consistently with the managers’ cognition. 
Some managers’ decisions are strictly guided by economic performance and risk evaluations, 
while others may also be driven by consideration of other, socioemotional, outcomes.  
 
The managers’ cognitive assessment of uncertain decisions is a fundamental issue in BAM 
(Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998), and its consideration has already enriched the 
understanding of disparate management processes, among which the extent of internal R&D 
efforts (Chrisman and Patel, 2012). Recently, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2010) suggested that family 
firm managers’ desire to retain control may affect technology strategy, favoring choices that 
maintain them adjacent to their existing technology platforms as opposed to venturing into new 
technology trajectories. However, no endeavor has been hitherto made to extend BAM to other 
aspects of a firm’s innovation and technology strategy, and whether managers’ cognition also 
influences a firm’s conduct in technology sourcing is a question that remains unanswered.  
 
The empirical analysis is conducted using a longitudinal dataset comprising 4,903 time-series 
cross-sectional observations, consisting of 1,540 Spanish companies operating in twenty 
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manufacturing industries over the period 2000-2006. The case of manufacturing firms is 
particularly interesting because products become rapidly obsolete and require innovation 
(Tushman and Anderson, 1986), and external technology acquisition is particularly suitable in 
contexts where products may embrace elements or subsystems developed by other players 
(Almirall and Casadesus-Masanell, 2010). It thus provides an opportunity to examine how 
performance risk, family involvement in top management, as well as technology protection 
mechanisms may affect the way firms adjust their technology boundaries in the wake of internal 
and external disruptions. 
 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The second and third sections give the 
theoretical underpinnings of our study and develop hypotheses. The fourth section describes the 
methodology and the fifth section reports the findings of the regression model. Discussion of 
these findings and their implications, identification of avenues for future research and 
conclusions follow. 
 
Behavioral Foundations of External Technology Acquisition 
 
Acquisition of technology from external sources (e.g., clients, suppliers, competitors, universities 
or research centers) can take several forms, ranging from mergers, acquisitions and joint 
ventures, to non-equity alliances, in-licensing and R&D contracting (Van de Vrande, Lemmens, 
and Vanhaverbeke, 2006). Whereas equity modes for external technology acquisition are 
characterized by a strong commitment from the parties involved, a low degree of reversibility, 
and a strong control over the outcome of the technology acquisition process, non-equity alliances 
such as in-licensing and R&D contracting require less commitment and are reversible, but ensure 
lower control to the parties involved in the development and outcome of the acquisition process 
(Chiesa and Manzini, 1998). The focus of this article is on R&D contracting, which entails 
externalizing R&D activities to a third party on the basis of a detailed contractual agreement and 
acquiring the technological knowledge resulting from the external organization’s R&D effort 
(Howells, Gagliardi, and Malik, 2008). The reasons for this focus are twofold. First, acquiring 
technology through R&D contracts represents an externally directed strategic action that 
drastically reduces the focal firm’s control over technology development and does not ensure 
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sharing of risk among parties. This makes it particularly appropriate for exploring the impact of 
family goals on technology strategy in that preserving the family’s control and authority is a 
primary source of non-economic benefits to family agents, causing idiosyncratic preferences of 
family firms toward risk (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Second, R&D contracting is very common 
in practice (Howells et al., 2008) but, despite this, it has received limited attention from 
innovation management research as a contractual form for external technology acquisition (Van 
de Vrande et al., 2009) compared, e.g., to in-licensing. 
 
To understand the decision to acquire technology from outside a firm’s boundaries, prior 
research has mainly adopted a perspective based on transaction cost theory (Tidd and Trewhella, 
1997; Williamson, 1998). The tactical view proposed by the transaction cost perspective 
underlines the relative costs of developing internally vis-a-vis buying a technology. The decision 
to source a technology from outside is therefore the result of a trade-off between the benefits of 
external acquisition, e.g., higher return on investment, lower costs, increased flexibility, access to 
specialized skill sets and creativity, and its drawbacks, e.g., opening the market to new entrants, 
risk of imitation of core competencies and reduced value appropriability (Calantone and Stanko, 
2007; West, 2003).  
 
What is neglected by this perspective is the role of performance feedbacks and managerial 
cognition in affecting the way the decision to acquire technology is framed. Research adopting a 
transaction cost perspective assumes that whenever rivals are precluded the opportunity to 
appropriate the focal firm’s know-how and profit from it, e.g., because of the presence of a 
strong appropriability regime, managers will frame the choice of acquiring external technology 
as positive, emphasizing the benefits of such decision. However, recent contributions (Almirall 
and Casadesus-Masanell, 2010; Zirpoli and Becker, 2011) show that leaving other firms develop 
parts of the final product involves ceding to the partners the autonomy to make choices that will 
affect the characteristics of future products. As technological innovations progress following 
path-dependent trajectories (Dosi, 1982), contracting the development of new technology outside 
the firm’s boundaries is likely to reduce the focal firm’s control over the long term technological 
trajectory of new products, meaning that the firm may be forced in the future to operate under 
constraints to organizational actions that could have been avoided in case of internal technology 
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development (Almirall and Casadesus-Masanell, 2010; Pfeffer and Salanik, 1978). As family 
managers are reported to seek non-economic utilities from being able to influence the type of 
goods produced by the firm (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), and to consequently frame strategic 
decisions differently from managers of non-family firms, limiting the analysis of external 
technology acquisition to economic considerations may result into inaccurate theory predictions. 
On the contrary, behavioral aspects such as performance feedbacks and managerial cognition 
have the potential to refine current understanding of the determinants of external technology 
acquisition and to provide important insights as to how managers actually evaluate benefits and 
drawbacks relative to this innovation practice. 
 
Behavioral considerations are especially crucial in family firms, where managers may be firmly 
reluctant to allow new actors from outside the family circle acquire the capacity to exert some 
influence and control over the strategic direction of the firm, as they can see this as a loss of 
socioemotional wealth (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). To understand the potential differences 
between family and non-family firms, a thorough consideration of the distinctive managerial 
cognitions in family firms and of their effect on the decision to externally acquire technology is 
needed. 
 
Managerial Decisions in Family Firms 
 
There is cumulating evidence that family involvement in businesses leads to distinctive 
objectives and sets of assumptions for managers about the way organizations should work, and 
these cognitive frameworks influence the family firm managers’ behavioral processes. Past 
research indicates that family firms follow particularistic goals such as keeping authority and 
control in the hands of the family, behaving altruistically with other family members, fulfilling 
the family members’ sense of belonging, affection, and intimacy, and growing the prestige and 
reputation of the family (Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino, 2003; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; 
Chrisman et al., 2012). These non-economic, family-centered goals  create utilities that are 
important to family firm managers because they create socioemotional wealth for the family 




The idea that family firms’ managers have different cognitions drives research on this ubiquitous 
form of business organization. The perspective adopted by family business research is the one of 
the dominant coalition in the firm influencing its internal processes (Cyert and March, 1963), 
which lays the foundations for asserting that administrative decision-making reflects the 
managers’ background, experience, knowledge and values (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). These 
ideas are wholly incorporated into BAM, which is a model of organizational behavior and risk 
taking that extends the traditional normative models of rational choice (Wiseman and Gomez-
Mejia, 1998). According to BAM, a decision maker’s risk preferences change with the framing 
of problems. Problems are framed as either positive or negative using a reference point to 
compare anticipated outcomes from available options, and the manner a choice is perceived by 
managers may thus affect their decisions (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998).  
 
Extending these tenets, recent studies have emphasized the importance of non-economic, family-
centered goals (Chrisman et al., 2012) that influence managerial cognition and concur to explain 
the decisions of managers in family firms (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). If managers in family 
firms are driven by a desire to preserve socioemotional wealth, this is likely to be reflected in 
their firms’ behaviors in the form of a preference toward organizational structures and actions 
that reduce risk and facilitate managerial control. For example, BAM has been used to show that 
family involvement causes a set of behaviors, including a higher executive entrenchment and 
lower compensation risk (Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, and Makri, 2003), the choice to 
embrace higher business risk in order to avoid losing control through the adherence to a 
producers’ cooperative association (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007), and a reluctance toward 
diversification when this means diluting family control (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010).  
 
Most recently, Chrisman and Patel (2012) applied the BAM perspective to explore the 
differences between family and non-family firms in terms of R&D investments. Their findings 
provide a firm theoretical rationale to prior empirical evidence of lower investments in R&D by 
family firms (e.g., Block, 2012; Chen and Hsu, 2009). The idea that loss-averse family firms are 
reluctant to internalize risky innovative activities in order to avoid threats to their socioemotional 
wealth is interesting because this implies that finding alternative technology strategies such as 
acquiring technological knowledge through R&D contracting may be a promising way for these 
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firms to provide new products to the marketplace. However, very little is known about the 
impact of the unique behavioral traits of family firms on decisions concerning external 
technology acquisition.  
 
In the next section, drawing upon the BAM perspective, a set of hypotheses is developed, that 
explore the possible effects of performance risk, family involvement in top management, and 
technology protection mechanisms on the managerial processes underlying the acquisition of 
external technology. 
 
Theoretical Development and Hypotheses 
 
Performance Risk and External Technology Acquisition 
 
Contrary to the traditional normative models of rational choice, BAM suggests that managers 
avoid decisions that they associate to threats to their wealth, even if this choice entails higher 
business risk. It follows that when deviations of performance outcomes below the aspiration 
level are observed, the target for comparison being either the firm’s past performance or the 
performance of other firms (Lant, 1992), managers perceive a threat in the form of a potential 
loss to their accumulated endowment and react by undertaking risky activities, such as searching 
for alternative routines, opportunities or technologies (Bromiley, 1991; Wiseman and Gomez-
Mejia, 1998). While past research has considered several types of risky activities, this article 
focuses on the decision to acquire technology from outside the firm’s boundaries. It is here 
argued that external technology acquisition entails a degree of hazard because it has the potential 
to raise organizational performance but it also entails high levels of risk and uncertainty 
associated with the outcome of R&D contracting, it exposes the focal firm to moral hazard 
problems, and it leads managers to operate in domains where they have less control than they 
have within their firms (Howells et al., 2008). Taken together, the application of BAM to 
external technology acquisition suggests that:  
 
H1: External technology acquisition is positively related to the gap between 
aspirations and performance (either in terms of a) discrepancy from a historical 
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performance target, or of b) discrepancy from performance of referent firms), so 
that the former increases as organizational performance negatively diverges from 
the aspiration level. 
 
 
Family Management and External Technology Acquisition 
 
Past research has shown that controlling families are primarily concerned with the possibility to 
lose their socioemotional wealth, and they are thus reluctant toward the dilution of their 
discretionary power over the firms’ strategic decisions (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Differently 
put, owners and managers in family firms hold different cognition of what is a crucial loss than 
those in non-family firms since preserving discretionary power is more salient to them than 
meeting a performance target. Since BAM proposes that decision makers are loss-averse, 
meaning that they are more sensitive to losing wealth than to increasing wealth (Wiseman and 
Gomez-Mejia, 1998), these differences in managerial cognition between family and non-family 
firms are expected by BAM to produce distinctive behaviors. In particular, rather than 
considering accumulated endowments like salary, promotions, titles and professional prestige, 
managers in family firms are likely to frame relinquishing their socioemotional wealth as a 
crucial loss and are thereby likely to accept threats to the firm’s financial wellbeing (e.g., lower 
innovativeness, declining performance) in order to prevent that loss.  
 
As discussed, the external acquisition of technology leads firms to cede discretionary power over 
innovation activities to external parties and lose some control over the trajectory of future 
product developments. In the eyes of family managers this can be seen as a barrier to the 
accomplishment of non-economic, family-centered goals and thus corrode the foundations of 
socioemotional wealth the family derives from being in control. Specifically, external technology 
acquisition is likely to entail greater complexity in product innovation (Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010) 
and would thus force family firms – that typically suffer disadvantages in terms of specialized 
human resources (e.g., Schulze et al., 2003) – to hire external managers, ceding to non-family 
managers some control over decision-making processes. Moreover, by contracting out the 
development of new technology to be implemented in the firm’s products, the firm devolves 
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substantial resources without any guarantee of returns, and the firm may need in the future some 
know-how from the technology partner, which it may not be able to gain elsewhere, allowing the 
external actor to gain some control over the focal firm’s resources and diminishing the focal 
firm’s power (Almirall and Casadesus-Masanell, 2010; Pfeffer and Salanik, 1978). For these 
reasons, losing control over the new products development trajectory may be seen by family 
managers as a loss of the family’s ability to exercise unconstrained authority, influence, and 
power over all aspects of the business (Schulze et al., 2003) and a threat to the authority 
foundation of socioemotional wealth (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). Besides authority, acquiring 
external technology also impairs the identity foundation of socioemotional wealth for the 
controlling family. Indeed, family firms tend to internally define their products and prefer them 
remaining within the firm boundaries because the family closely identifies with those products 
(Donnelley, 1964). Such association of the family name with the firm products reflects the 
willingness of the family to have its name recognized and respected within the community 
(Dunn, 1996), and can be lost when allowing other parties to take control over the new product 
development.  
 
In view of the foregoing, managers in family firms are expected to hold different cognitions 
regarding the decision to acquire external technology from those held by managers in non-family 
firms. In spite of its potential benefits, family firm managers are likely to avoid such decision in 
order to preserve the authority and identity foundations of socioemotional wealth for the family. 
Thus, it is proposed that: 
 
H2: There is a negative relationship between external technology acquisition and 
family management. 
 
Organizations are likely to become more inclined to search for alternative opportunities and 
routines when faced with deviations of performance outcomes below the aspiration level 
(Bromiley, 1991; Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). According to BAM, the reference point for 
such organizational actions is typically based on economic returns - as previously hypothesised - 
either in terms of the firm’s past performance or the average performance of other firms in the 




However, in family firms, family goals and economic goals  interact in setting the organizational 
strategic actions (Chrisman and Patel, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). As discussed above, 
engaging in technology sourcing may represent a threat to the authority and identity foundations 
of socioemotional wealth for the controlling family. As a consequence, whereas non-family 
managers may perceive below-aspiration level performance as a potential loss to their wealth, 
and respond by acquiring external know-how in order to recover innovativeness, managers in 
family firms are likely to set the loss of socioemotional wealth as their primary concern, and 
avoid external technology acquisition even in face of negative performance feedbacks. In other 
words, consistent with the idea that family firms are more willing to tolerate below-target 
performance as a condition of retaining control of the firm (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007), avoiding 
actions that threat the preservation of socioemotional wealth for the controlling family can be 
expected to be more salient to family firm managers than meeting a performance target. For 
these reasons, it is hypothesized that: 
 
H3: Family management moderates the relationship between external technology 
acquisition and the gap between aspirations and performance (either in terms of 
a) discrepancy from a historical performance target, or b) discrepancy from 
performance of referent firms), so that the relationship is weaker among family 
than non-family firms.  
 
 
Control Beliefs: The Contingent Role of Technology Protection  
 
The model proposed in this article has hitherto assumed that family firms generally avoid 
external technology acquisition because it entails loss of socioemotional wealth for the 
controlling family. However, contingency theories of strategic decisions (Baird and Thomas, 
1985) posit that managerial evaluation of different strategies is also affected by the competitive 
settings of the business. Incorporating contingency factors into the model will help isolate the 
effects of family firm managers’ cognitive differences regarding the decision to acquire external 
technology and will provide higher external validity to the above arguments, moving from 
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universalistic predictions toward a contingency view of strategic decisions in family firms. In 
addition, it allows relaxing the assumptions that family-centered goals are always divergent from 
the firms’ economic goals, and exploring the conditions under which family firms can undertake 
risky competitive actions without obstructing the controlling families’ socioemotional utilities.  
One specific factor that characterizes the competitive setting in which the decision to acquire 
external technology is made and may affect family firms’ negative propensity toward this choice 
is the degree of protection of the focal firm’s proprietary technologies ensured by intellectual 
property rights (IPRs). The existence of effective mechanisms to protect proprietary technology 
is an important contingency when analyzing technology acquisition, because such mechanisms 
increase the managers’ perceptions of their ability to appropriate economic rents from 
technology development and to preserve control over the trajectory that technology follows over 
time (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000; Gambardella, Giuri, and Luzzi, 2007). Research on 
deliberate decision making suggests that beliefs about the presence of factors that may facilitate 
or impede performance of a behavior and the perceived power of these factors constitute the 
control beliefs of a decision maker (Ajzen, 2002). Similarly, research in strategy has shown that 
top executives who believe they can control the outcomes of their decisions tend to pursue more 
aggressive strategies (Miller, Kets de Vries, and Toulouse, 1982).  
 
Following this line of reasoning, if lower external technology acquisition in family firms is to be 
attributed to different cognition of managers, meaning that the crucial loss for family firms 
managers is represented by the loss of control over the trajectory of future products development 
rather than poor performance, it is reasonable to expect that family firms’ reluctance toward  the 
adoption of an open approach to innovation is likely to deaden when some protection 
mechanisms are put in place that preserve such control. These mechanisms may be seen as a 
defense against the uncertainty associated to loss of control over technology, increasing 
managers’ perception about the family firm’s power in the relationship with external actors, and 
reducing the family firm managers’ cognition of risks associated with loss of socioemotional 




H4: Technology protection moderates the relationship between external 
technology acquisition and family management so that the relationship is weaker 
when family firms’ technology is protected by intellectual property rights. 
 










The hypotheses developed in this article are tested on a representative sample of Spanish firms 
from the database Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales (Survey on Business Strategies, 
ESEE), produced by a public institution financed by the Spanish Ministry of Industry. The ESEE 
was designed with the aim of ensuring the representativeness of Spanish manufacturing firms. 
For this purpose, all companies with more than 200 employees were surveyed (and 
approximately 70% completed the survey), and smaller companies with more than 10 employees 
were selected on the basis of a stratified sampling. The focus on manufacturing industries is 
considered appropriate in the context of external technology acquisition because in such 
H4 










industries firms’ products typically embrace elements or subsystems developed by other players 
(Almirall and Casadesus-Masanell, 2010). Moreover, the unbalanced feature of this dataset 
implies that the firms can enter and exit from the survey in the same way the companies appear 
and disappear in the economy. For this reason, this sample is apt to observe sufficient degrees of 
performance and business risk. Restricting the sample of companies to observations in the same 
time period would affect the randomness of the sample, and there would be a much lower 
probability of firms facing declining performance to be included. Furthermore, the typically high 
degree of obsolescence of manufacturing firms’ products makes these firms particularly inclined 
to rely on innovation (Tushman and Anderson, 1986). Indeed, this database has already been 
used in previous innovation studies (e.g., Alonso-Borrego and Forcadell, 2010). In total, the 
sample used in this article includes 4,903 time-series cross-sectional observations, consisting of 





External technology acquisition. Although there are different forms through which firms can 
acquire external technology, for the reasons discussed in the previous section, this study focuses 
on R&D contracting, that captures the total expenses made by a firm to buy R&D services from 
other organizations such as competitors, suppliers, universities, public research organizations 
(Van de Vrande et al., 2009). This variable is calculated as the ratio of external expenses for 




Negative performance feedbacks. Performance is here assessed using ROA, defined as the net 
operating income divided by total assets. The measurement of performance using ROA is widely 
supported in the literature, particularly for manufacturing firms. Moreover, ROA is a 
performance indicator very susceptible to the influence of managers, and has been used in 
previous studies applying BAM to innovation decisions (Chrisman and Patel, 2012). Following 
prior research (Chrisman and Patel, 2012), a continuous censored variable is constructed to 
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measure each of the two types of gaps between aspirations and performance, namely discrepancy 
from a historical performance and from performance of referent firms. This reflects the 
assumption that, as negative discrepancies between the firm’s performance and either its 
historical performance or the performance of competitors widen, decision makers are more likely 
to perceive gaps between current performance and aspirations (Iyer and Miller, 2008). The first 
gap measure, historical performance gap, refers to the magnitude of performance shortfalls 
between periods and was measured by comparing a firm’s performance in time t-1 and its 
performance in time t-2. A score of zero means that the target was achieved. The second gap 
measure, referent-target performance gap, consists of a comparison of the focal firm’s 
performance in time t-1 with the performance of other firms in the sector in time t-2, based on 
the average ROA of firms in the relevant two-digit NACE industry. Both variables were 
measured by their absolute value, meaning that the resulting magnitude of positive scores 
indicates the extent to which the firm falls below the performance target of either past 
performance or referent firms’ performance in a particular year.  
 
Family management. Family firms are defined as firms with a particularistic vision of business 
and goals resulting from the presence of a controlling family (Chua et al., 1999). A direct 
measure of family vision and goals is not available in the ESEE database. This is a common 
problem to which prior research has typically obviated by assuming that family vision and goals 
are highly correlated to the extent of family involvement in the firm (e.g., Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2010). This assumption has also received empirical validation (e.g., Chrisman et al., 2012; 
Chrisman and Patel, 2012), so this study adopts an objective measure of family influence. For all 
those firms that are family owned  the ESEE database reports the number of owners and owner’s 
relatives who occupy top managerial positions. Based on this information, a continuous variable 
counting the number of family members in top managerial positions in time t, is built to measure 
family management (e.g., Cruz et al., 2010). 
 
Technology protection. Patents are key legal mechanisms to protect proprietary technology and 
to exclude rivals from using company’s own inventions (e.g., Levin et al., 1987). Strong and 
dependable patents increase the innovator’s ability to appropriate economic rents from its 
technology by, e.g., facilitating the proof of patent infringements (Lanjouw, 1998), making it 
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harder for other companies to invent around the patent (Gambardella et al., 2007) and by raising 
the defenses against the competitive aspects of external relationships (Katila et al., 2008). 
Managers increasingly rate patents as an effective means of protecting some parts of the firm’s 
product invention against rivals’ divergent interests, which is supported by the strong growth in 
international patenting since the late 1980s (Athreye and Cantwell, 2007). The ESEE database 
reports the number of international patents a company registers in each year, but no information 
is available regarding the total stock – and quality – of patents held by each firm. Consistently 
with prior research (e.g., Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004), a raw count of patents is used as a 
reasonable proxy of the quality of protection mechanisms put in place by a firm. Therefore, 
technology protection is measured as the difference between the number of patents registered in 
time t-1 and those registered in time t-2. This variable takes positive values if a firm has 
increased the protection of its internal technological know-how and has presumably amplified 




In order to rule out possible alternative explanations to those formally hypothesized, the model 
includes the following six control variables lagged at t-1 that could potentially affect the 
dependent variable. Firm age is measured as the number of years between the foundation of the 
firm and the observation year. Firm size is measured as logged annual sales. Internal R&D 
intensity is measured as the ratio of a firm’s internal R&D expenditures to sales and acts a proxy 
of absorptive capacity because sourcing decisions may be influenced by the firm’s ability to 
absorb new capabilities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Return on assets accounts for the overall 
firm efficiency. Debt is measured as the total liabilities provided by third parties adjusted by 
sales. Finally, equity is measured as the sum of equity capital, reserves and results pending 




The descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables are reported in Table 1. As the 
assumption for normal distribution could not be met in the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
19 
 
regression model, the panel-EGLS (estimated generalized least squares) estimator was used. The 
independent variables were centered around the mean before calculating the interaction terms in 
order to avoid problems of multicollinearity among the variables in the regression equation 
(Cohen, 2003). The variance inflation factor after each regression was calculated to see whether 
results were subject to the threat of multicollinearity. Values were within acceptable limits, 
indicating that estimations were free of any significant multicollinearity bias. The Hausman test 
suggests that fixed effect GLS panel model is more appropriate than random effect (Chi-
Square=30.761, p<0.01). In addition, redundant fixed effect test indicates that the fixed effect of 
periodic dimension needs to be controlled (F-Statistic=2.141, p<0.001). As such, two-way fixed 
effect GLS panel regression is used as the tool of our primary analysis. White’s (1980) cross 
sectional correction of covariance is used to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (N = 4,903) 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. External technology acquisition (%) 0.15 0.80 1.00      
2. Historical performance gap 2.26 10.68 -0.02 1.00     
3. Referent-target performance gap 10.17 85.90 -0.01 0.02 1.00    
4. Family management 0.59 0.91 -0.05 0.03 0.04 1.00   
5. Technology protection mechanisms  -0.04 3.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 1.00  
6. Age 26.91 21.10 0.07 -0.04 -0.04 -0.08 -0.02 1.00 
7. Size (log total asset) 13.86 2.53 0.15 -0.19 0.03 -0.24 -0.01 0.37 
8. Internal R&D intensity (%) 0.17 0.87 0.25 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.08 
9. Return on assets 3.26 15.32 -0.02 -0.14 -0.04 0.04 0.00 -0.01 
10. Liabilities 1.18 2.88 -0.01 0.20 0.05 0.02 0.00 -0.09 
11. Equity 0.75 0.88 -0.01 0.19 -0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01 
Variable 7 8 9 10 11    
7. Size (log total asset) 1.00        
8. Internal R&D intensity (%) 0.17 1.00       
9. Return on assets -0.15 -0.03 1.00      
10. Liabilities -0.22 -0.01 0.11 1.00     
11. Equity -0.23 -0.01 0.24 0.40 1.00    









Table 2 reports the results of the regression model used to test the hypotheses. Estimated 
coefficients are standardized. Hypotheses 1a and 1b propose that firms use external technology 
acquisition when their performance falls below the aspiration level. The effect of historical 
performance gap is not significant, so that hypothesis 1a is not supported, but external 
technology acquisition is significantly higher at p<.001 when performance fell below the 
referents firms’ performance, strongly supporting hypothesis 1b. The results also show a 
significant negative effect at p<.01 of family management on external technology acquisition. 
Thus, hypothesis 2 is supported. 
 
Table 2. Effects of Performance Risk, Family Management, and Technology Protection on 
External Technology Acquisition 





1. Referent-target performance gap 0.009*** 0.030*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
2. Historical performance gap -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
3. Family management -0.025** -0.023* 
 (0.008) (0.010) 
4. Technology protection mechanisms -0.001 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
5. Family management × Referent-target performance gap -0.016** -0.017** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
6. Family management × Historical performance gap 0.001 -0.003 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
7. Family management × Technology protection mechanisms 0.009** 0.007* 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
8. Internal R&D intensity 0.136** 0.136*** 
 (0.037) (0.027) 
9. Age -0.044*** -0.037*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
10. Size (log asset) -0.009 -0.022 
 (0.068) (0.071) 
11. Return on assets 0.001 0.002 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
12. Liabilities 0.022 0.025* 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
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13. Equity -0.027† -0.028 
  (0.028) (0.027) 
Observations 4,903 4,903 
Adjusted R2 0.266 0.233 
F-Statistics 2.141*** 1.957*** 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. Standardized coefficients are reported. 
 
The moderation effects predicted in hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 4 were tested including the 
corresponding interaction terms in the regression model. Hypotheses 3a and 3b propose that 
family management moderates the negative relationship between external technology acquisition 
and negative performance feedbacks. The results show that the moderating effect of family 
management on the relationship of external technology acquisition is not significant for historical 
performance gap, so hypothesis 3a is not supported. However, the relationship is significant at 
p<.01 for referent-target performance gaps. As hypothesized, the coefficient of the interaction 
term is negative, suggesting that family management reduces the strength of the relationships, 
thus confirming hypothesis 3b. To facilitate interpretation, the relationship between external 
technology acquisition and referent-target performance gap for firms with and without family 
management has been plotted in Figure 2. Consistently with prediction, this figure clearly shows 
much lower elasticity of external technology acquisition to below-target performance for family 
versus non-family firms.  
 
 
Figure 2. Effects of Performance Risk on External Technology Acquisition 
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Notes: Family management is controlled by 0 family members in top management and +1 standard deviation from 
the mean. The vertical scale is based on mean and unstandardized estimated coefficients of all other variables in 
fixed effect panel regression; insignificant coefficients are controlled as zero. 
 
Hypothesis 4 proposes that the negative relationship between external technology acquisition and 
family management is moderated by technology protection, so that the relationship is weaker 
when the firms’ proprietary technologies are protected through patents. Results in Table 2 show 
that technology protection does not affect directly external technology acquisition, but it affects 
at significance level of p<.01 the relationship between external technology acquisition and 
family management. This brings support to hypothesis 4. These relationships are drawn in Figure 
3 to facilitate interpretation. As represented in Figure 3, the negative line plotted for the family 
management variable in the case of no technology protection mechanisms becomes flat when 
such mechanisms are put in place. As a post hoc test, given α error probability equals to 0.01, the 
analysis is found to have enough power (power: 1-β error probability=1.000) to capture the 




Figure 3. Effects of Family Management on External Technology Acquisition by 
Technology Protection 
Notes: Without Technology Protection is controlled as 0. Strong Technology Protection is controlled by +1 standard 
deviation from the mean. The vertical scale is based on mean and unstandardized estimated coefficients of all other 






Although the sample includes only manufacturing firms, and family firms are reported to be 
quite distributed among all industrial sectors (Anderson and Reeb, 2003), additional analyses 
have been conducted in order to assess the possibility of artifactual results in Table 2 due to 
aggregating these firms across different manufacturing industry sectors. Table 3 shows the 
sample distribution of companies by two-digit industry and by family business status (based on 
the presence of at least two family members in top management). The analysis reveals that 
family involvement is a common feature of firms belonging to a broad array of industries in our 
sample, the average being 36.8% of all firms. However, the ratio of family firms ranges between 
a minimum of 14.8% in the motor vehicles industry and 60.92% in the furniture industry, 
indicating that controlling for industry affiliation may be important for our empirical analysis.  
 
Table 3. Distribution of Firms by Industry and Family Status* 
Industry All firms Family firms Non-family firms 
Family firms 
ratio 
Agricultural and industrial machinery 391 131 260 33.5% 
Beverage 67 13 54 19.4% 
chemicals 328 52 276 15.9% 
Electrical machinery and apparatus 308 92 216 29.9% 
Ferrous and nonferrous 173 34 139 19.7% 
Food and snuff 462 165 297 35.7% 
Furniture industry 238 145 93 60.9% 
Leather and footwear 134 70 64 52.2% 
Meat  123 59 64 48.0% 
metal products 495 215 280 43.4% 
Motor vehicles 240 33 207 13.8% 
Non-metallic mineral products 337 118 219 35.0% 
Office machines, data processing, and 66 29 37 43.9% 
Other manufacturing 113 49 64 43.4% 
Other transport 108 16 92 14.8% 
Paper  170 42 128 24.7% 
Publishing and printing 241 98 143 40.7% 
Rubber and plastic 294 116 178 39.5% 
Textiles and clothing 474 253 221 53.4% 
Timber  141 75 66 53.2% 
Total 4903 1805 3098 36.8% 
* Observations refer to firms’ yearly attributes; family firms are defined as those firms where two or more 
members of a controlling family are actively involved in the top management. 
 
To ensure the robustness of the results, the full regression in Table 2 is run again,  while 
adjusting external technology acquisition by industry level. Specifically, the industry influences 
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are controlled by subtracting to each firm’s external expenses in R&D to sales in year t the 
median industry level of external R&D intensity in the same year. The results, reported in the 
second column of Table 2, were consistent with our primary analysis, although some coefficients’ 
significance was slightly altered: the coefficient for family management in Table 2 changed from 
-0.025 to -0.023, significant at p≤0.05; internal R&D intensity became more significant at p≤0.01; 
the coefficients for liabilities and equity ratios changed into significant at p≤0.05 and 
insignificant, respectively; finally, the interaction between family management and technology 
protection in Table 2 changed from 0.009 to 0.007, now significant at p≤0.05. Taken as a whole, 
the R2 of the model changed from 26.6% to 23.3% and all results of post-hoc analyses were 
confirmed. Thus, the adoption of an alternative measure of technology acquisition that takes into 




Prior research has approached the decision to acquire external technology based on a transaction 
cost perspective and therefore as a purely economic matter, modeling it as a trade-off between 
the benefits and drawbacks of technology sourcing. This article extends these tenets by adopting 
a BAM perspective to investigate how behavioral considerations of performance risk and 
different managerial cognition frameworks affect external technology acquisition.  
 
The findings show that managers are more likely to acquire technology from external parties 
through R&D contracting when firm performance falls below the aspiration level. Also, family 
firms are found to be more reluctant to acquire external technology vis-a-vis non-family firms, 
and the influence of negative aspiration performance gaps becomes less relevant as family 
management is higher. This effect is attributed to family firm managers’ attempts to avoid losing 
control over the trajectory that technology follows over time. However, this general tendency is 
mitigated by an important factor, technology protection: family firms become more favorable to 
consider the adoption of an open approach to innovation when patents on proprietary 
technologies increase the managers’ perceptions of control over the technology trajectory. As 
such, this study makes a contribution to the understanding of the factors driving external 




First, the theoretical and empirical analyses of this article suggest a new way for approaching 
decisions regarding external technology acquisition. The application of BAM shows that 
managers’ willingness to acquire technology from outside the firm’s boundaries changes with the 
framing of problems on the basis of the available options to prevent losses to accumulated 
endowment (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). When managers observe deviations of 
performance outcomes below the aspiration level they become more likely to explore external 
technology in order to speed up innovativeness and identify new business opportunities. Further, 
the findings reveal that referent-target aspirations matter most when considering the choice to 
acquire external technology, whereas historical target-performance gaps are found to be not 
significant. Whereas prior research (e.g., Chrisman and Patel, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007) 
posited  that internal and external reference targets are likewise incorporated by managers in 
their consideration of risky decisions, the results of this study may signal that self-reflection is 
not a relevant reference dimension for externally oriented organizational actions such as the 
acquisition of external technology. Rather, the evidence provided here can be interpreted as a 
preliminary indication that a loss of competitive advantage relative to the industry is the primary 
reference when it comes to externally oriented actions: managers who see a decline in their 
assets’ profitability react proactively in order to recover their competitive positioning by, for 
example, sourcing new technological assets from external organizations. In sum, this study 
contributes to research regarding the decision to adopt open innovation by shedding light on the 
behavioral processes that are relevant for understanding the decision to acquire external 
technology (Lichtenthaler, 2011), and it calls for further research aimed at better understanding 
the differential effect of internal and external reference dimensions on different types of 
organizational actions.  
 
Second, by considering the different assumptions for managers in family and non-family firms 
and focusing on the effects of the family firms’ propensity to preserve socioemotional wealth for 
the family (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007), this article uncovers some barriers to open innovation that 
were not considered in prior research (Lichtenthaler, 2011). Although acquiring external 
technology may be seen as a way to quickly develop new products, the reluctance to cede control 
over the technological trajectory of new products to external actors drives family firms’ aversion 
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to this practice. Prior research has focused on the technical and economic implications of sharing 
control over the innovation trajectory with external parties (Dosi, 1982; Almirall and Casadesus-
Masanell, 2010), but it is here shown that family firms may prefer to adopt a strategy that 
preserves the firm’s discretion over technology decisions in the long term, because ceding such 
control represents a threat to both the authority and identity foundations of socioemotional 
wealth (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010).  
 
More broadly, this article provides a complementary perspective to the prevailing view that 
transaction costs drive managers’ decision to embrace external technology acquisition. In 
addition to economic considerations, managers use external technology acquisition as a response 
to declining performance, but when the preservation of socioemotional wealth becomes a 
priority, as it happens in family firms, the firm is less likely to acquire external technology even 
if this means accepting below target performance. From a practical point of view, this 
encourages R&D and product managers to make explicit the reasons underlying their decisions 
to acquire a technology or develop it internally, although they do not entirely respond to an 
economic logic. This will help them verify the correctness of their perceptions regarding benefits 
and drawbacks of acquiring a specific technology, to reduce potential biases engendered by 
performance feedbacks, and therefore improve their decision making process. 
 
In addition to extending the behavioral perspective to the field of technology strategy, this study 
has theoretical and practical implications for strategic management in family firms. The 
emphasis on the family as a controlling interest and its influences on technology strategy has 
empirical relevance because family control is the predominant form of governance around the 
world (La Porta et al., 1999) and family firms are widespread across all industrial sectors 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Not only the findings of this article extend the understanding of the 
risk taking behaviors of family firms (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Chrisman and Patel, 2012) to 
the arena of technology strategy, but they also introduce the idea that the pursuance of 
socioemotional wealth by the part of controlling families is contingent on the internal conditions 
of the firm. In particular, it is here shown that managers can pursue family goals and undertake 
risky activities at the same time when some protection mechanisms are in place that increase the 
firm’s ability to preserve socioemotional wealth. If the firm owns proprietary rights over its 
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technologies, managers’ perception about the family firm’s power in the relationship with 
external actors increases and they become more favorable to consider the acquisition of external 
technology. This finding has strong implications for both theory and practice, because it 
challenges the idea that the willingness to preserve socioemotional wealth is an uncontrollable 
force and introduces the possibility that family firm managers actively take actions to secure 
their particularistic interest, thus becoming able to undertake risky activities while continuing to 
preserve socioemotional wealth for the family. As such, these results bring support to the idea 
that family-centered goals and the firm’s economic goals are not necessarily divergent (Chrisman 
and Patel, 2012) and add to previous research by identifying technology protection as a practical 
mechanism that makes these goals compatible rather than conflicting in the decision to open the 
firm’s technology boundaries. Future research is needed to discover further mechanisms and 
contingency factors aside technology protection that allow family firms to keep their 
particularistic goals safe without damaging their ability to conduct aggressive and risky 
competitive strategies. 
 
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
 
Aside from its contributions, this study has several limitations, which not only represent the 
boundaries of its insights but also provide opportunities for future research. First, research using 
other sampling frames than Spanish manufacturing firms is needed to extend the validity of the 
findings to publicly traded firms and firms outside Spain. Also, by considering only Spanish 
firms it was not possible to observe the effect of different national patent regimes on the extent 
of external technology acquisition. Taking a cross-country perspective in future studies will 
allow to assess the relative importance of low appropriability and loss of control on the 
technology trajectory as barriers to inbound open innovation. 
 
Second, this study relies on secondary data sources and, similarly to recent studies (Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2010; Chrisman and Patel, 2012), the pursuance of family goals to obtain 
socioemotional wealth was proxied by family ownership and management. Based on prior 
research, it is here assumed that family goals and socioemotional wealth go hand in hand with 
family involvement (Chrisman et al., 2012). However, this study shows that despite similar 
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configurations of family involvement, family firms may differ in the level of family goals they 
pursue and the importance they attach to the preservation and growth of socioemotional wealth. 
Thus, research is needed to measure family goals and further extend the understanding of the link 
between family involvement and family goals, consistently with a more heterogeneous view of 
family firms (Chrisman and Patel, 2012; De Massis et al., forthcoming-c).  
 
Third, the analysis shows that family firms’ reluctance towards external technology acquisition is 
lower when technology protection mechanisms are put in place. These results, while providing 
novel insights into the conditions under which family-centered goals can be pursued jointly with 
the economic goals of the firm, only catch one of the possible factors that might affect the 
interplay between family and economic goals. Further research is warranted to uncover all other 
factors, both internal and external, that may potentially determine the compatibility or hierarchy 
among the two classes of goals that coexist in family firms. For instance, extending the BAM to 
consider further contingency factors such as the product life-cycle, competition, or institutional 
pressures, has the potential to significantly improve the understanding of the interplay between 
family and economic goals in family firms, and consequently to enhance the predictive power of 
empirical models. 
 
Finally, this article focuses on a specific form through which external technology can be 
acquired, i.e., R&D contracting. Future research is thus needed to extend the findings to other 
governance forms such as in-licensing or joint-ventures. 
 
In conclusion, this article provides a novel perspective, based on the behavioral agency model, to 
explain firms’ decisions to acquire external technology. The results show that behavioral factors, 
overlooked in prior research, are important in explaining family and non-family firms’ decisions 
regarding the boundaries of technology development activities. While this study brings new 
perspectives to research on technology and innovation management and extends prior knowledge 
about the distinctiveness of family firms, more research is needed to better understand the 
behavioral processes driving strategic decisions in technological innovation among family firms 





Ajzen, I. 2002. Perceived behavioral control, self efficacy, locus of control, and the theory of 
planned behavior. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 32 (4): 665-683. 
Almirall, E., and R. Casadesus-Masanell. 2010. Open versus closed innovation: A model of 
discovery and divergence. Academy of Management Review 35 (1): 27-47. 
Alonso-Borrego, C., and F. J. Forcadell. 2010. Related diversification and R&D intensity 
dynamics. Research Policy 39 (4): 537-548. 
Anderson, R. C., and D. M. Reeb. 2003. Founding-family ownership and firm performance: 
Evidence from the S&P 500. The Journal of Finance 58 (3): 1301-1327. 
Astrachan, J. H., and M. C. Shanker. 2003. Family businesses' contribution to the us economy: A 
closer look. Family Business Review 16 (3): 211-219. 
Athreye, S., and J. Cantwell. 2007. Creating competition?: Globalisation and the emergence of 
new technology producers. Research Policy 36 (2): 209-226. 
Baird, I. S., and H. Thomas. 1985. Toward a contingency model of strategic risk taking. 
Academy of Management Review 10 (2): 230-243. 
Block, J. H. 2012. R&D investments in family and founder firms: An agency perspective. 
Journal of Business Venturing 27 (2): 248–265. 
Boudreau, K. 2010. Open platform strategies and innovation: Granting access versus devolving 
control. Management Science 56 (10): 1849-1872. 
Bromiley, P. 1991. Testing a causal model of corporate risk taking and performance. Academy of 
Management Journal 34 (1): 37-59. 
Calantone, R. J., and M. A. Stanko. 2007. Drivers of outsourced innovation: An exploratory 
study. Journal of Product Innovation Management 24 (3): 230-241. 
Cassia L., A. De Massis, and E. Pizzurno. 2012. Strategic Innovation and New Product 
Development in Family Firms: an Empirically Grounded Theoretical Framework. 
International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour & Research, 18 (2): 198-232. 
Chatterji, D. 1996. Accessing external sources of technology. Research Technology Management 
39 (2): 48-56. 
Chen, H. L., and W. T. Hsu. 2009. Family ownership, board independence, and R&D 
investment. Family Business Review 22 (4): 347. 
Chiesa, V., and R. Manzini. 1998. Organizing for technological collaborations: A managerial 
perspective. R&D Management 28 (3): 199-212.
30 
 
Chrisman, J. J., J. H. Chua, A. W. Pearson, and T. Barnett. 2012. Family involvement, family 
influence, and family centered non economic goals in small firms. Entrepreneurship Theory 
and Practice 36 (2): 267-293. 
Chrisman, J. J., and P. J. Patel. 2012. Variations in R&D investments of family and non-family 
firms: Behavioral agency and myopic loss aversion perspectives. Academy of Management 
Journal 55 (4): 976-997. 
Christensen, C. M., S. D. Anthony, and E. A. Roth. 2004. Seeing what's next: Using the theories 
of innovation to predict industry change. Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press. 
Chua, J. H., J. J. Chrisman, and P. Sharma. 1999. Defining the family business by behavior. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 23 (4): 19-39. 
Cohen, J. 2003. Applied multiple regression/correlation analysis for the behavioral sciences. 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Cohen, W. M., and D. A. Levinthal. 1990. Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on learning 
and innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly 35 (1): 128-152. 
Cohen, W. M., R. R. Nelson, and J. P. Walsh. 2000. Protecting their intellectual assets: 
Appropriability conditions and why us manufacturing firms patent (or not). National Bureau 
of Economic Research, Working paper 7552. 
Cruz, C. C., L. R. Gómez-Mejia, and M. Becerra. 2010. Perceptions of benevolence and the 
design of agency contracts: CEO-TMT relationships in family firms. Academy of 
Management Journal 53 (1): 69-89. 
Cyert, R. M., and J. G. March. 1963. A behavioral theory of the firm. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall. 
Dahlander, L., and D.M. Gann. 2010. How open is innovation? Research Policy 39 (6): 699-709. 
De Massis, A., F. Frattini, and U. Lichtenthaler. Forthcoming-a. Research on technological 
innovation in family firms: Present debates and future directions. Family Business Review. 
DOI: 10.1177/0894486512466258. 
De Massis A., F. Frattini, E. Pizzurno, and L. Cassia. Forthcoming-b. Product Innovation in 
Family vs. Non-Family Firms: an Exploratory Analysis. Journal of Small Business 
Management. 
De Massis A., J. Kotlar, J. Chua, and J. J. Chrisman. Forthcoming-c. Ability and Willingness as 
Sufficiency Conditions for Family-Oriented Particularistic Behavior: Implications for Theory 
and Empirical Studies. Journal of Small Business Management. 
Demsetz, H., and K. Lehn. 1985. The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and 
consequences. The Journal of Political Economy 93 (6): 1155-1177. 
Donnelley, R. G. 1964. The family business. Harvard Business Review 42: 93-105. 
31 
 
Dosi, G. 1982. Technological paradigms and technological trajectories: A suggested 
interpretation of the determinants and directions of technical change. Research Policy 11 (3): 
147-162. 
Dunn, B. 1996. Family enterprises in the UK: A special sector? Family Business Review 9 (2): 
139-155. 
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A.G., and Buchner, A.  2007. G*Power 3: A flexible statistical 
power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences. Behavior 
Research Methods 39: 175-191. 
Gambardella, A., P. Giuri, and A. Luzzi. 2007. The market for patents in europe. Research 
Policy 36 (8): 1163-1183. 
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., K. T. Haynes, M. Núñez-Nickel, K. J. L. Jacobson, and J. Moyano-Fuentes. 
2007. Socioemotional wealth and business risks in family-controlled firms: Evidence from 
spanish olive oil mills. Administrative Science Quarterly 52 (1): 106-137. 
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., M. Larraza-Kintana, and M. Makri. 2003. The determinants of executive 
compensation in family-controlled public corporations. Academy of Management Journal 46 
(2): 226-237. 
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., M. Makri, and M. Larraza-Kintana. 2010. Diversification decisions in 
family-controlled firms. Journal of Management Studies 47 (2): 223-252. 
Grimpe, C., and U. Kaiser. 2010. Balancing internal and external knowledge acquisition: The 
gains and pains from R&D outsourcing. Journal of Management Studies 47 (8): 1483-1509. 
Hambrick, D. C., and P. A. Mason. 1984. Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection of its 
top managers. Academy of Management Review 9 (2): 193-206. 
Howells, J., D. Gagliardi, and K. Malik. 2008. The growth and management of R&D 
outsourcing: Evidence from UK pharmaceuticals. R&D Management 38 (2): 205-219. 
Iyer, D. N., and K. D. Miller. 2008. Performance feedback, slack, and the timing of acquisitions. 
Academy of Management Journal 51 (4): 808-822. 
Katila, R., J. D. Rosenberger, and K. M. Eisenhardt. 2008. Swimming with sharks: Technology 
ventures, defense mechanisms and corporate relationships. Administrative Science Quarterly 
53 (2): 295. 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 1999. Corporate ownership around 
the world. The Journal of Finance 54 (2): 471-517. 
Lanjouw, J. O. 1998. Patent protection in the shadow of infringement: Simulation estimations of 
patent value. Review of Economic studies 65 (4): 671-710. 




Levin, R. C., A. K. Klevorick, R. R. Nelson, S. G. Winter, R. Gilbert, and Z. Griliches. 1987. 
Appropriating the returns from industrial research and development. Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity 1987 (3): 783-831. 
Lichtenthaler, U. 2011. Open innovation: Past research, current debates, and future directions. 
Academy of Management Perspectives 25 (1): 75-93. 
Miller, D., M. F. R. Ketz De Vries, and J. M. Toulouse. 1982. Top executive locus of control and 
its relationship to strategy-making, structure, and environment. Academy of Management 
Journal 25 (2): 237-253. 
Pfeffer, J., and G. Salancik. 1978. The external control of organizations: A resource dependence 
perspective. New York: Harper & Row. 
Pisano, G. P. 1990. The R&D boundaries of the firm: An empirical analysis. Administrative 
Science Quarterly 35 (1): 153-176. 
Rothaermel, F. T., and D. L. Deeds. 2004. Exploration and exploitation alliances in 
biotechnology: A system of new product development. Strategic Management Journal 25 
(3): 201-221. 
Schulze, W. S., M. H. Lubatkin, and R. N. Dino. 2003. Toward a theory of agency and altruism 
in family firms. Journal of Business Venturing 18 (4): 473-490. 
Swan, K. S., and B. B. Allred. 2003. A product and process model of the technology-­‐sourcing 
decision. Journal of Product Innovation Management 20 (6): 485-496. 
Tidd, J., and M. J. Trewhella. 1997. Organizational and technological antecedents for knowledge 
acquisition and learning. R&D Management 27 (4): 359-375. 
Tushman, M. L., and P. Anderson. 1986. Technological discontinuities and organizational 
environments. Administrative Science Quarterly 35 (4): 439-465. 
Van de Vrande, V., J. P. J. De Jong, W. Vanhaverbeke, and M. De Rochemont. 2009. Open 
innovation in smes: Trends, motives and management challenges. Technovation 29 (6-7): 
423-437. 
Van De Vrande, V., C. Lemmens, and W. Vanhaverbeke. 2006. Choosing governance modes for 
external technology sourcing. R&D Management 36 (3): 347-363. 
West, J. 2003. How open is open enough? Melding proprietary and open source platform 
strategies. Research Policy 32 (7): 1259-1285. 
Williamson, O. E. 1998. Transaction cost economics: How it works; where it is headed. 
Economist 146 (1): 23-58. 
Wiseman, R. M., and L. R. Gomez-Mejia. 1998. A behavioral agency model of managerial risk 
taking. The Academy of Management Review 23 (1): 133-153. 
33 
 
Zirpoli, F., and M. C. Becker. 2011. The limits of design and engineering outsourcing: 






The authors acknowledge Fundación Empresa Pública for providing the empirical data. This 
research is part of the project “External technology acquisition in family firms” (ID: 318).  
Technology Acquisition in Family and Non-Family Firms: A Longitudinal Analysis of Spanish 
Manufacturing Firms 
 
